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COMMERCIAL LAW
BY GEORGE E. ROEDER*
INTRODUCTION
The Kentucky Court of Appeals rendered numerous com-
mercial law decisions in the 1979-80 survey period. This Sur-
vey will consider a small number of those decisions and will
focus on their application of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.).1 It will be noted that Kentucky courts have often
followed a narrow, "statute by statute" approach to code in-
terpretation rather than considering the underlying purposes
and policies of the U.C.C. 2 As a result, Kentucky decisions are
often at variance with decisions from other U.C.C. states as
well as at odds with the stated policies of the U.C.C.3
I. ESTOPPEL AND ARTICLE Two's STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Estoppel has long been used by Kentucky courts to reach
equitable results in contract cases.4 Although promissory es-
* J.D. 1981, University of Kentucky.
The Kentucky version of the Uniform Commercial Code is contained in chap-
ter 355 of the KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES [hereinafter cited as KRS]. For purposes
of this article, the terms "Uniform Commercial Code," "U.C.C." and "code" will be
used interchangeably and sections of this body of law will be cited by U.C.C. section
number in text. Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to the 1962 official text.
Other cases decided during the survey year worthy of note are: Owensboro Nat'l
Bank v. Crisp, 608 S.W.2d 51 (Ky. 1980) (interrelationship of the "imposter rule" and
bank negligence under article three); Kentucky Club, Inc. v. Fifth Third Bank, 590
S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1979) (Court refused to apply article six, bulk transfers, to the sale
of a restaurant-bar business); Riley v. West Ky. Prod. Credit Assoc., 603 S.W.2d 916
(Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (emphasizing the aversion of Kentucky courts to awarding attor-
ney's fees under the U.C.C. in the absence of an express contractual provision or a
clear statutory mandate independent of code provisions). For an excellent discussion
of Crisp, see Comment, The Role of Negligence in Section 3-405 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: Owensboro National Bank v. Crisp, 69 Ky. L.J. 143 (1980-81).
' These purposes and policies are set out in KRS § 355.1-102 (1972) as well as in
the official comments of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.
' For a recent discussion of this problem, see Minahan, The Eroding Uniformity
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 Ky. L.J. 799 (1976-77).
4 See, e.g., Wright v. Williams, 77 S.W. 1128 (Ky. 1904) and cases cited therein.
In Wright, the Court employed elements of estoppel to deny appellee recovery of a
10-foot alleyway that had been represented to a prior purchaser as part of the parcel
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toppel has never been explicitly adopted in Kentucky,5 the
Kentucky Supreme Court used this concept in Meade Con-
struction Co. v. Mansfield Commercial Electric, Inc.' In
Meade, a contractor relied upon the oral bid of a subcontrac-
tor, who later refused to perform. The defendant subcontrac-
tor did not raise a Statute of Frauds defense nor was this de-
fense considered by the Court, which granted relief to the
plaintiff contractor on an estoppel theory.
A similar situation arose in C. G. Campbell & Son v.
Comdeq Corp.,7 a 1979 Kentucky Court of Appeals case. In
Comdeq, a contractor relied upon the oral, telephoned bid of a
subcontractor, who later discovered an error in his bid price
and refused to perform. The contractor sued for damages, and
the defendant subcontractor raised a Statute of Frauds de-
fense. The court distinguished Meade on this basis" and re-
fused to grant equitable relief. The article two statute of
frauds, U.C.C. section 2-201,9 was applied very strictly to find
but that the deed failed to convey.
' See Meade Constr. Co. v. Mansfield Commercial Elec., Inc., 579 S.W.2d 105
(Ky. 1979). For a discussion of Meade, see Comment, An "Equivocal Estoppel". The
Strange Career of Promissory Estoppel in Kentucky Contract Law, 68 Ky. L.J. 184
(1979-80). While "equitable estoppel" is based upon an affirmative misrepresentation
and is available only as a defense, "promissory estoppel" involves a promise of future
action and can be both a defense and a cause of action. Id. at 186 n.10. See generally
Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1069 (1956) (a discussion of promissory estoppel).
6 579 S.W.2d at 105.
586 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
8 Id. at 41.
KRS § 355.2-201 (1972) states:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale
of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or
defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for
sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against
whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing
is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon
but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quanti-
ty of goods shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confir-
mation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the
party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the require-
ments of subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of objection
to its contents is given within ten (10) days after it is received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1)
but which is valid in other respects is enforceable
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there was no contract absent a writing signed by the party to
be charged,10 in this case, the subcontractor.
The Comdeq court reasoned that the only legislatively in-
tended exceptions to the harsh general rule in U.C.C. section
2-201(1) are contained in U.C.C. section 2-201(2) and (3)11
and rejected any attempt "to judicially amend [the] stat-
ute. '' 12 There is no indication, however, that the Kentucky
legislature even considered the application of promissory es-
toppel to the Statute of Frauds in article two. The Legislative
Research Commission made no reference to the problem in its
comments to U.C.C. section 2-201.13 Furthermore, there is no
discussion in Comdeq of section 1-103,11 which allows general
principles of estoppel to supplement other code provisions. 5
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are
not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business
and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circum-
stances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has
made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments
for their procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his
pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made,
but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the quanti-
ty of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and ac-
cepted or which have been received and accepted (KRS 355.2-606).
Id.
1o 586 S.W.2d at 41.
11 Id. The court declared that the exclusive exceptions to the general Statute of
Frauds provision of KRS § 355.2-201(1) appear in subsections (2) and (3). For the
text of this statute, see note 9 supra.
12 586 S.W.2d at 41.
13 KENTUCKY LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, RESEARCH PUBLICATION No. 49,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS ON EXISTING KENTUCKY LAW 30-32
(1957) [hereinafter cited as LRC].
24 KRS § 355.1-103 (1972) provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this chapter, the principles
of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capac-
ity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, du-
ress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating
cause shall supplement its provisions.
Id.
15 Other jurisdictions that have considered the specific question of applicability
of estoppel to the Statute of Frauds have used § 1-103 to bring those considerations
to bear. See, e.g., Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa
1979); Sacred Heart Farmers Coop. Elevator v. Johnson, 232 N.W.2d 921 (Minn.
1975).
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In conditioning the use of estoppel principles solely on
the illusive concept of legislative intent as gleaned from a
strict focus upon the words of the statute, the court miscon-
ceives the origins and purposes of estoppel. Equitable consid-
erations are not grounded in legislative intent but rest upon
judicially administered concepts of fairness. 16 Although equi-
table exceptions to legislative determinations should be em-
ployed prudently, they should nonetheless be applied when an
unfair result would otherwise occur. 17 This is particularly true
under the harsh conditions of U.C.C. section 2-201(1), be-
cause, as one commentator has noted, "no statute of frauds
yet drafted. . . has been able to anticipate every combination
of facts which requires decision."18
Still further support for the application of estoppel to
U.C.C. transactions may be found in two paragraphs of U.C.C.
section 1-102(2), which express purposes and policies of the
code.19 Paragraph (b) states the policy of "continued expan-
sion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agree-
ment of the parties." Kentucky courts have recognized the
For a discussion of the applicability of § 1-103 in introducing general equitable
principles into the U.C.C., see Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Sec-
tion 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 Nw. L. REv. 906 (1978).
1" See, e.g., Trimble v. King, 114 S.W. 317 (Ky. 1908). See generally 28 AM.
JUR.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 28 (1966). As the court in Janke Constr. Co. v. Vulcan
Materials Co., 386 F. Supp. 687, 697 (W.D. Wis. 1974), stated, "The statute of frauds
relates to the enforceability of contracts; promissory estoppel relates to promises
which have no contractual basis and are enforced only when necessary to avoid
injustice."
'7 Smith v. Ash, 448 S.W.2d 51 (Ky. 1969).
18 R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 30 (1970).
1 When considering the application of the Statute of Frauds to a particular case,
one must "take account of the broader and deeper policy questions that underlie the
statute." L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 14 (1959).
The purposes and policies of the U.C.C. are set out in KRS § 355.1-102 (1972):
(1) This chapter shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this chapter are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
Id. See KRS § 355.1-102 (1972) and comment 1; LRC, supra note 13, at 4.
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availability of estoppel in a number of areas.2" Even in the
subcontractor bid situation, the Kentucky Supreme Court has
sanctioned the use of estoppel.21 Yet the Comdeq court de-
clined to use the principle in a nearly identical fact situation
simply because the case arose under the U.C.C. 22 Such a result
clearly conflicts with the code's continued expansion policy as
well as with its policy of reflecting the commercial transaction
as it develops in the reality of modern business dealings.23
Paragraph (2)(c) of U.C.C. section 1-102 further states
the policy of "making uniform the law among the various ju-
risdictions."' 2' A majority of jurisdictions has applied promis-
sory or equitable estoppel to avoid the harsh effects of U.C.C.
section 2-201(1),25 and most commentators have recom-
mended this approach.26 Although a minority of jurisdictions
20 See, e.g., Wright v. Williams, 77 S.W. 1128 (Ky. 1904) and cases cited therein.
See also Smith v. Ash, 448 S.W.2d 51 (Ky. 1969). The Smith decision addresses the
issue of applicability of equitable estoppel to the Statute of Frauds requirement for
land conveyances. For a discussion of promissory estoppel as a basis for the avoid-
ance of Statutes of Frauds, see generally Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 1037 (1974).
21 579 S.W.2d at 105.
22 That this distinction makes no sense on a policy basis was the basic argument
of the dissent in C.R. Federick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852 (9th Cir.
1977) (Wallace, Cir. Judge, dissenting). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the previous
California decision in Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958), which
applied promissory estoppel to the contractor/subcontractor situation, was inappro-
priate because Drennan involved a bid for both goods and services, and thus U.C.C. §
2-201 would not apply.
21 This policy is exemplified by the U.C.C.'s emphasis upon transactions "be-
tween merchants," KRS § 355.2-104 (1972), and its focus upon "course of dealing"
and "usage of trade." KRS § 355.1-205 (1972). Note also the official comments to
these sections of the U.C.C.
24 KRS § 355.1-102(2)(c) (1972).
25 See, e.g., Janke Constr. Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 386 F. Supp. at 687 (con-
tractor/subcontractor bid situation); Jenkins & Boiler Co. v. Schmidt Iron Works,
Inc., 344 N.E.2d 275 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (contractor/subcontractor suit over effect of
architect's specifications); Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d at 339
(grain sale); Decatur Coop. Assoc. v. Urban, 547 P.2d 323 (Kan. 1976) (grain sale);
Sacred Heart Farmers Coop. Elevator v. Johnson, 232 N.W.2d at 921 (grain sale);
Farmers Coop. Assoc. v. Cole, 239 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1976) (grain sale); Farmers Ele-
vator Co. v. Lyle, 238 N.W.2d 290 (S.D. 1976) (grain sale).
28 R. NORDSTROM, supra note 18, at § 30; J. WHITE & R. SuMMERs, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 206 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as WHITE & SuMMERs]; Summers, supra note 15, at 906; Note, Promissory Es-
toppel, Equitable Estoppel and Farmer as a Merchant: The 1973 Grain Cases and
the UCC Statute of Frauds, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 59; Note, The "Firm Offer" Problem
1980-811
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has rejected the application of estoppel to U.C.C. section 2-
201(1),27 this rejection may have been due to "a different view
of the doctrine of promissory estoppel rather than because of
any perceived statutory bar to its use."'28
The Kentucky Court of Appeals' strict application of
U.C.C. section 2-201 is particularly striking when contrasted
with the Kentucky Supreme Court's position in Meade and
the court of appeals' own decision in Harry Harris, Inc. v.
Quality Construction Co.2" Six months after the Comdeq deci-
sion, the court of appeals, in Harris, applied estoppel to assess
damages against a breaching subcontractor. The crucial factor
and point of departure from the Comdeq rationale was the
unavailability of the U.C.C. section 2-201 Statute of Frauds
defense, since the defendant subcontractor had not raised it. 30
Thus, in two non-U.C.C. cases promissory estoppel principles
were applied to enforce oral contracts." The issue of the doc-
in Construction Bids and the Need for Promissory Estoppel, 10 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 212 (1968); Comment, Promissory Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds in Cali-
fornia, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 590 (1965); Recent Decisions, 48 Miss. L.J. 883 (1977); Com-
ment, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 230 (1976). Contra, Note, Farmer Is Not A Merchant But
Promissory Estoppel May Bar the Application of the Statute as a Defense, 25 KAN.
L. REV. 318 (1977).
27 See, e.g., 552 F.2d at 852; Cox v. Cox, 289 So.2d 609 (Ala. 1974); Farmland
Serv. Corp. v. Klein, 244 N.W.2d 86 (Neb. 1976).
218 274 N.W.2d at 341 (citing Cox v. Cox, 289 So.2d 609 (Ala. 1974); Del Hayes &
Sons, Inc. v. Mitchell, 230 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. 1975); 244 N.W.2d at 86). These cited
cases held promissory estoppel inapplicable because the courts perceived promissory
estoppel as either a substitute for consideration or as applying when no contract in
fact exists.
29 593 S.W.2d 872 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
30 "Unlike [Comdeq], the appellant in this case has not raised the application of
KRS 355.2-201, and therefore we have not considered it." Id. at 874.
31 It is likely that other variations of the contract bidder situation may arise. For
example, KRS § 355.2-201(3)(a) (1972) protects the seller of specially manufactured
goods after he has begun the manufacturing process in reliance upon the buyer's or-
der. What if, instead of manufacturing the special goods, the seller who does not keep
those special items in stock and does not manufacture them orders them from a third
party before the buyer repudiates? See Holahan, Contract Formalities and the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 3 VILL. L. REV. 1, 16 (1957). Furthermore, why should protec-
tion be extended only to the seller of specially manufactured goods? Does the con-
tractor who must rely upon the good faith of the subcontractor in a construction
bidding situation not stand in a similar position to a seller who relies upon the good
faith order of the buyer of specially manufactured goods? The Comdeq court failed to
consider these questions of equity.
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trine's application in code cases remains to be resolved by the
Kentucky Supreme Court, and it seems clear that the same
considerations guiding the Court in Meade should control in
U.C.C. cases also.32
II. KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES SECTION 446.060(1) AND
THE DEFINITION OF "SIGNED" IN U.C.C. SECTION 1-201(39)
In contrast to the Comdeq decision, in which the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals refused to apply extra-code equitable
principles to militate against harsh code results, another panel
of that court did use extra-code principles of statutory con-
struction in R. C. Durr Co. v. Bennett Industries, Inc.3 Ben-
nett, a fabricator of heavy steel, sent a written offer to supply
steel to Durr for construction of two interstate highway over-
passes, pursuant to Durr's contract with the Department of
Transportation. A Durr official accepted the offer by signing
in the space provided. Beneath the signature lines, the follow-
ing statement appeared: "This quotation is subject to the
terms and conditions on the reverse side hereof." On the back
of the document were twenty paragraphs and conditions of
the offer including a limitation on Bennett's liability for liqui-
dated and consequential damages." Subsequently Bennett
supplied the requested steel but, because of alleged delays in
delivery and defects in the product, Durr refused to pay the
contract price. Bennett instituted suit for payment, and Durr
counterclaimed for damages. The circuit court granted sum-
mary judgment to Bennett and dismissed the counterclaim.
The court of appeals reversed, focusing on the subscrip-
32 Another question the Comdeq court did not address was the possible applica-
tion of KRS § 355.2-201(3)(b) (1972), which provides that if the party against whom
enforcement is sought admits that a contract was made, the contract is enforceable.
See note 9 supra for the text of this provision. The Comdeq court indicated that
there was no dispute as to the facts. It is unclear however, whether an oral contract
was ever formed. If an oral contract was formed, admission of this fact in defendant's
pleadings would satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
33 590 S.W.2d 338, 339 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
34 KRS § 355.2-719 (1972) allows for contractual modifications or limitation of
liquidated damages subject to KRS § 355.2-718 (1972), which provides a standard of




tion requirement of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section
446.060(1). That section provides: "When the law requires any
writing to be signed by a party thereto, it shall not be deemed
signed unless the signature is subscribed at the end or close of
the writing."3 5 The court reasoned that the placement of a sig-
nature at the close of a writing raised the inference that the
signer intended to authenticate and to be bound by that por-
tion of the writing above the signature.3 6 Durr, therefore, was
not bound by the clauses limiting Bennett's liability that ap-
peared on the back of the form.
The crucial issue in Durr is the relationship of KRS sec-
tion 446.060(1) to U.C.C. section 1-201(39), the U.C.C.'s defi-
nition of "signed." That code section states that "'signed' in-
cludes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with
present intention to authenticate a writing. '3 7 The court of
appeals examined U.C.C. section 1-201(39) but concluded that
it "relate[d] to what constitutes a valid signature, not to
where the signature must be placed."38 Apparently KRS sec-
tion 446.060(1) answers the latter question. This simplistic
view fails to consider the intent underlying the two provisions.
KRS section 446.060(1) was originally enacted by the
1850 session of the Kentucky General Assembly as a sub-
chapter of "An Act to Revise the Statutes" entitled "Con-
struction of Statutes." 9 No sufficient history of the act is
available to determine what the legislature intended this pro-
vision to accomplish. 40 Nevertheless, the provision did abro-
3" KRS § 446.060(1) (1972).
36 590 S.W.2d at 339-40. This is the common interpretation of the purpose of
KRS § 446.060(1) (1972). See Gentry's Guardian v. Gentry, 293 S.W. 1094 (Ky. 1927).
7 KRS § 355.1-201(39) (1972). Prior to Durr only one other Kentucky case,
Childers & Venters, Inc. v. Sowards, 460 S.W.2d 343 (Ky. 1970), had alluded to a
possible relationship between KRS § 446.060(1) (1972) and KRS § 355.1-201(39)
(1972). This case involved exclusions of implied warranties of fitness appearing on the
reverse side of a contract for the sale of a truck. Unlike Durr, the provisions incorpo-
rating these exclusions into the body of the contract were printed above the signature
of the buyer. Therefore, the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the statute
was applicable to code transactions, since the doctrine of incorporation by reference,
which survived KRS § 446.060(1), brought the addition to the contract into the body.
See Kelley v. J.R. Rite Realty Co., 32 S.W.2d 28 (Ky. 1930).
38 590 S.W.2d at 340.
1850 Ky. Acts, Vol. 1, 212, 235-38.
" Note, Place of Maker's Signature on Bill or Note, 16 Ky. L.J. 159, 160 (1928).
[Vol. 69
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gate the common law principle that a signature could appear
on any part of the document if made with the intent and pur-
pose of authenticating or giving effect to the document. 1
Many Kentucky courts, however, refused to require more than
"substantial compliance" with the new statute. 2 According to
these courts, the purpose underlying KRS section 446.060(1)
was to supply a "logical inference that the writing to which it
is thus appended expresses all which the signer wished to au-
thenticate and to which he intended to be bound, and that
nothing has been added to the writing which the signer did
not wish to so authenticate.' 43 The requirement eliminated
the need to inquire into the signer's intent and allowed courts
to avoid questioning whether the writing was a preliminary
draft or a completed document." It appears, therefore, that
KRS section 446.060(1) was designed as a legislative device to
provide the courts with a simple rule for determining the in-
tent of the signer and was not intended merely as a rule for
placement of signatures.
In modern commercial transactions, and especially those
in which merchants are involved, 5 the need to determine
when there is "intent" to finalize an agreement has largely
vanished. Documents passing from party to party often seek
4! 293 S.W. at 1094; Note, End or Close of Promissory Note Within Meaning of
Kentucky Statutes Section 468 (KRS 446.060), 31 Ky. L.J. 350 (1943). See generally
72 AM.JUR.2d Statute of Frauds §§ 360-61 (1974).
42 See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Seal, 155 S.W.2d 20 (Ky. 1941) (signature on a note);
293 S.W. at 1094 (signature on a deed); Lucas v. Brown, 219 S.W. 796 (Ky. 1920)
(signature on a will). From the outset the courts did not adopt a literal construction
of this statute. Note, supra note 41, at 350. A survey of the cases decided under KRS
section 446.060(1) (1972) indicates that twice as many cases were excepted from the
rule for substantial compliance as were found to come within the rule. The former
cases usually relied upon some other indicia of the signer's intent to validate the
signature. See, e.g., Antle v. Haas, 251 S.W.2d 290 (Ky. 1952); Parrott v. Parrott's
Adm'x, 110 S.W.2d 272 (Ky. 1937); Hays v. Marshall, 48 S.W.2d 540 (Ky. 1932); Gra-
ham v. Edwards, 173 S.W. 127 (Ky. 1915). But see, e.g., Miller's Ex'r v. Shannon, 299
S.W.2d 103 (Ky. 1957); Kaiser v. Jones, 163 S.W. 741 (Ky. 1914).
"' 293 S.W. at 1094.
4 Teater v. Newman, 472 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Ky. 1971). This reasoning was ap-
plied to wills in the Teater case but is also applicable to other documents.
" See KRS § 355.2-207 (1972), U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 1, and KRS § 355.2-204
(1972) for the U.C.C.'s concept of modern commercial transactions. For a discussion
of "The Concept of Professionalism" in the code, see 3 BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE SERVICE § 1.02 (1980 and Supp.).
1980-81]
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to impose advantageous terms after the basic agreement has
been reached and performance has begun. Even when terms
of an agreement are not specified, the U.C.C. provides tools to
ascertain the actual agreement, or, if that is unascertainable,
supplies the missing contract terms through its own gap-filling
provisions.4e For these reasons, it is no longer essential to
identify the extent of an agreement through signature place-
ment. Recognizing this, the drafters of U.C.C. section 1-
201(39) readopted the common law,4 7 making the code provi-
sions antithetical to KRS section 446.060(1).
The use of a formalistic test to determine intent is not
only unnecessary, but may disrupt the smooth functioning of
the U.C.C. For example, assume that both Durr and Bennett
met the requirements of "merchants" under the code.48 If
Durr made no response to the written "confirmation" that
Bennett sent and Bennett proceeded to manufacture and de-
liver the requested steel, Durr could have been bound under
U.C.C. section 2-201(2).49 Furthermore, the terms of the writ-
ten contract to which Durr failed to object may have been
used to establish the terms of the oral agreement.50 It is ironic
11 See part 3 of article 2 for the U.C.C.'s gap-filling provisions.
47 For a discussion of common law authentication, see the text accompanying
note 41 supra. "The Code expressly 'deformalizes' the signature requirement." WHrrE
& SUMMERS, supra note 6, at § 2-4.
48 KRS § 355.2-104(1) (1972) provides:
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to
the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowl-
edge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or
other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such
knowledge or skill.
Id.
49 For the text of § 2-201, see note 9 supra.
50 Shpilberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 535 S.W.2d 227 (Ky.
1976). The Court discussed the comment to KRS § 355.2-201 (1972) that states that
the receipt of a writing without objection only prevents the Statute of Frauds defense
from being claimed, and that the burden is still on the one who seeks performance to
prove the contract and terms. The Court stated: "[T]he comment [to KRS § 355.2-
201] obviously does not mean that the writing, which under the statute is required to
be sufficient to 'indicate that a contract has been made,' is not acceptable evidence of
the fact that a contract was made." The Court continued: "[I]f the writing contains
all of the essential elements of a contract . .. it should be treated as conclusive evi-
dence of the existence of the contract, subject to attack only on the grounds on which
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that Durr might have been bound to the whole contract by
not signing, while under the court of appeals' analysis, after
signing, he is liable only for portions of the contract above his
signature.
U.C.C. section 1-201(39), like KRS section 446.060(1), was
designed to focus on the intent of the signer, but U.C.C. sec-
tion 1-201(39), unlike KRS section 446.060(1), recognizes that
the intent of the signer should not be obscured with undue
formalism.51 The Legislative Research Commission (LRC) ex-
plicitly considered the interrelation of KRS section 446.060(1)
and U.C.C. section 1-201(39), stating that "[t]he broadening
of the terms 'signed' and 'signature' may alter present law."52
The LRC comment also made reference to the U.C.C. com-
ment that states that the signature "may be on any part of
the document and in appropriate cases may be found in a bill-
head or letterhead.""3
In addition to overlooking the specific comments of the
LRC, the court of appeals in Durr, as in Comdeq, failed ade-
quately to consider the U.C.C.'s underlying policy "to make
uniform the law among the various jurisdictions."" The Ken-
tucky Supreme Court, in fact, early in the history of the
U.C.C. in Kentucky, recognized that adoption of the U.C.C.
indicated a "legislative policy to join with other states in
achieving uniformity. . . unfettered by anachronisms." ' The
a written contract may be attacked." 535 S.W.2d at 229-30.
51 "The question always is whether the symbol was executed with present inten-
tion to authenticate the writing." U.C.C. § 1-201 comment 39.
52 LRC, supra note 13, at 14.
" U.C.C. § 1-201 comment 39 (emphasis added). Kentucky courts have fre-
quently referred to the Commissioner's comments regarding questions of interpreta-
tion of the U.C.C. See, e.g., Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Skyways Enterprises, 580 S.W.2d 491
(Ky. 1979); General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Citizens Fid. Bank & Trust Co.,
519 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1975); White v. Winchester Land Dev. Corp., 584 S.W.2d 56, 59
n.3 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
04 KRS § 355.1-102 (1972). See note 19 supra for the text of this provision. For a
discussion of the applicability of § 1-102 in another context, see text accompanying
notes 24-32 supra.
11 Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Ky. 1961). In
Queenan, the Court refused to apply the provisions of three pre-code statutes to the
KRS § 355.9-402 (1972) requirements of a financing statement. The Court did allow a
fourth statute, relating to certificates of title for motor vehicles, to affect code provi-
sions but only after noting several factors that tended to indicate legislative intent.
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Court adopted a rule of construction "that the Code is plenary
and exclusive except where the legislature has clearly indi-
cated otherwise."5 Yet, the court of appeals in Durr, by ap-
plying a strict subscription requirement to section 1-201(39),
has adopted a unique position among all U.C.C.
jurisdictions. 57
However unclear the rationale for the decision in Durr
may be, the implications are quite clear. The court of appeals
indicates that a contract required to be written under the
Statute of Frauds provision of the U.C.C. must be subscribed
at the close of the writing. It is therefore important that prac-
titioners review all documents used in both article two and
non-article two commercial transactions to assure that the sig-
nature is placed at the physical end of the document unless
there is an incorporating provision in the body. Otherwise,
only that portion of the document above the signature may be
considered as part of the agreement.
III. THE CLOSE CONNECTEDNESS DocTRINE IN KENTUCKY
LAW
The holder in due course (HDC) doctrine was originally
intended to facilitate mercantile transactions in a commercial
setting where "notes," though not legal tender, were traded
much the same as paper currency.58 The role of the promis-
sory note evolved considerably as the growth of consumer
credit accelerated after World War II. Although commercial
law continued to adhere to HDC theory,59 widespread abuse
See also Corbin Deposit Bank v. King, 384 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1964).
56 344 S.W.2d at 385.
57 For a summary of the cases addressing this issue, see 6B BENDER'S UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE § 1-201(39) (1980 and Supp.).
11 Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758). This case is widely regarded as
the first case recognizing the holder in due course doctrine. See generall Rosenthal,
Negotiability-Who Needs It? 71 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 377-79 (1971).
" This doctrine is currently incorporated into article 3 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. KRS § 355.3-302(1) (1972) defines an HDC as a holder who takes an in-
strument: "(a) for value; and (b) in good faith; and (c) without notice that it is over-
due or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any
person." The HDC under article 3 takes the instrument free from "(1) all claims to it
on the part of any person; and (2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with
whom the holder has not dealt [except certain enumerated defenses]." KRS § 355.3-
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of the theory and resulting unfairness to luckless consumers
generated harsh criticism demanding its reform.60 In response,
the federal and state legislatures enacted protective legislation
in the consumer paper area,61 and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion promulgated controversial regulations to preserve con-
sumer claims and defenses. 2
Prior to legislative efforts, however, the courts began to
attack blatant abuses of HDC status.63 The close connected-
ness doctrine developed out of judicial abhorrence of the cruel
effects rendered at times by the HDC doctrine in consumer
cases.6 4 Close connectedness focuses upon the financer's con-
nection with the business operation of the seller of goods in-
volving credit transactions.65 When a court finds the requisite
suspect relationship, it denies HDC status to the holder of the
305 (1972). While the protection provided by HDC status historically covered holders
of consumer notes, many sellers added a "waiver of defense" clause to the conditional
sales agreement, whereby the buyer agreed not to assert any defense against an as-
signee of the consumer paper that could be asserted against the seller. KRS § 355.9-
206 (1972) makes such agreements enforceable by the assignee subject to any statute
or decision that establishes a different rule for buyers of consumer goods. For the text
of KRS § 355.9-206, see note 67 infra. The FTC rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1-.3 (1980), is
designed to render inapplicable this protection to assignees in consumer credit sales.
60 See, e.g., Johnston, Unico v. Owen-Judicial Mastery of the "Hard Case", 24
RUTGERs L. REV. 500 (1970); Littlefield, The Continuing Demise of the Holder in
Due Course Concept, 79 Com. L.J. 41 (1974); Rosenthal, supra note 58, at 375; Note,
Attempts to Preserve Consumer Defenses in Kentucky and Under the FTC, 15 J.
FAMi. L. 770 (1976-77); Note, The Federal Trade Commission Rule on the Preserva-
tion of Consumers' Claims and Defenses-What Price Protection?, 16 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 815 (1976) (particularly those articles cited at 816 n.9); Note, The FTC's
Holder-in-Due-Course Rule: An Ineffective Means of Achieving Optimality in the
Consumer Credit Market, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 821 (1978); Note, The FTC's Preserva-
tion of Consumers' Claims and Defenses: Consumer Security or Consumer Fraud?,
11 VAL. L. REV. 263 (1977).
61 See, e.g., Federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-93r (1976 & Supp.
1979); Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, KRS §§ 367.110-.390 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
62 16 C.F.R. § 433.1-.3 (1980). For review and criticism of the FTC rule, see the
authorities cited in note 60 supra.
63 See Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 137 S.W.2d 260 (Ark. 1940); Western
Elec. Co. v. Uhlrig, 273 P. 417 (Kan. 1929); Davis v. Commercial Credit Corp., 94
N.E.2d 710 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950). See generally Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 8 (1955) (a dis-
cussion of defenses which the purchaser of chattels may raise against the holders of
his commercial paper).
64 See Unico v. Owen, 232 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1967).
65 Id. at 411. See also American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 240 N.E.2d 886, 888-89
(Ohio Ct. App. 1968).
1980-81]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69
note.
Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Utley"s is the only Kentucky
case to apply the close connectedness doctrine; there the
Court held that the manufacturer who regularly purchased
consumer paper from a dealer of its own equipment was the
true vendor in the transaction and could not claim HDC sta-
tus as a defense to the implied warranties available under the
code. 17 The Court declared that the policy of the U.C.C. was
"to encourage the supplying of credit for the buying of goods
by insulating the lender from lawsuits over the quality of the
goods. . .[but] that the insulation was intended primarily for
financial institutions rather than the manufacturer who
66 439 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1969).
67 KRS § 355.2-314 (1972) provides in relevant part:
(1) Unless excluded or modified, (KRS 355.2-316) a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind ....
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as...
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used
Id. KRS § 355.2-315 (1972) provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particu-
lar purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying
on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is
unless excluded or modified under KRS § 355.2-316 an implied warranty
that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
Id.
The Court also found that the manufacturer was a "seller" rather than an "as-
signee" within the terms of KRS § 355.9-206 (1972), which provides:
(1) Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for
buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or lessee that
he will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense which he may
have against the seller or lessor is enforceable by an assignee who takes his
assignment for value, in good faith and without notice of a claim or defense,
except as to defenses of a type which may be asserted against a holder in
due course of a negotiable instrument under the article on commercial pa-
per (article 3). A buyer who as part of one (1) transaction signs both a
negotiable instrument and a security agreement makes such an agreement.
(2) When a seller retains a purchase money security interest in goods the
article on sales (article 2) governs the sale and any disclaimer, limitation or
modification of the seller's warranties.
Id. Therefore, the manufacturer could not claim the protection of the "waiver of de-
fense" clause in the purchase contract. For a discussion of this kind of clause, see
note 59 supra.
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finances his own sales."68
In Sullivan v. United Dealers Corp., 9 the Court sug-
gested that the close connectedness doctrine, when applicable,
will deny HDC status to a seller's business associate who is
not primarily an independently acting lending institution.7 0 In
Sullivan, the issue was whether United Dealers Corporation, a
finance company, was an HDC of a promissory note executed
by the Sullivans in payment for building materials furnished
by the contractor-payee of the note. When the Sullivans de-
faulted, United Dealers instituted action against them. The
Sullivans charged that United Dealers was not an HDC of the
note and that it was therefore subject to the defense that the
contractor-payee of the note constructed the Sullivan home in
a unworkmanlike manner. The Court did not apply the close
connectedness doctrine, however, because it found no evi-
dence of any direct connection between the contractor-payee
and the finance company other than a frequent course of deal-
ing between the two. Thus the close connectedness doctrine,
as applied by Kentucky's highest court, depends both upon
the type of lending institution involved and the relationship
between the financing institution and the seller. In light of
statutory and administrative controls, 71 application of the
close connectedness doctrine in the consumer credit area may
be redundant; the possibility of extending the doctrine to
nonconsumer credit transactions, however, is worthy of note.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals addressed the scope of
the close connectedness doctrine in Citicorp Leasing, Inc. v.
Whitaker,7 2 in which a creditor holding a promissory note and
security agreement covering two bulldozers claimed HDC sta-
tus. Primarily this case involved a nascent coal-mining part-
nership that, in order to purchase the bulldozers, schemed
with a local auction company to deceive the financial institu-
tion into loaning money. After the fraud was discovered, the
partnership refused to make payment on the loan contract,
68 439 S.W.2d at 60.
69 486 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1972).
70 Id. at 701.
7 For examples of such controls, see notes 61 and 62 supra.
7- 605 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
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claiming the financer was closely connected with the auction
company and thus subject to the defenses of failure of title
and failure of consideration that the partnership possessed
against the auction company. The court, however, refused to
apply the close connectedness doctrine under these
circumstances.
In its analysis, the court first examined the financial
lender to determine whether it was a "manufacturer" or
rather an institution that the Massey-Ferguson court consid-
ered worthy of protection under U.C.C. policy.73 It concluded
that Citicorp was not a manufacturer and that it qualified for
insulation from liability. The court found no precedent in
Kentucky for a broader application of the close connectedness
doctrine74 and refused to adopt a more liberal interpretation
for the Citicorp facts. Further, the court found no sufficient
evidence of a close association between the auction company
and Citicorp to impugn the good faith position of Citicorp7
The furnishing of forms, performance of credit checks, and
some previous course of dealing between the auction company
and Citicorp were, according to the court, "nothing out of the
ordinary in this type of business. 7 6
The Citicorp court implied that the close connectedness
doctrine is limited to cases involving consumer goods.77 An ex-
amination of cases decided in other jurisdictions, however,
clearly indicates a contrary interpretation.7 8 The close con-
nectedness doctrine has been applied to many situations that,
although exhibiting some of the indicia of consumer transac-





7 "[Tihese holdings have invariably been in cases where there is a consumer
involved who has been given a raw deal." Id.
78 See, e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 214 P.2d
819 (Cal. 1950) (equipment); International Harvester Co. v. Carruth, 23 So.2d 473
(La. Ct. App. 1945) (farm equipment); International Fin. Corp. v. Rieger, 137 N.W.2d
172 (Minn. 1965) (equipment).
7 Consumer goods are specifically defined in U.C.C. article 9. KRS § 355.9-109
(1972) declares: "Goods are (1) 'Consumer goods' if they are used or bought for use
primarily for personal, family or household purposes . . . ." See also 16 C.F.R. §
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the Massey-Ferguson case that initially applied the close con-
nectedness doctrine in Kentucky involved farm equipment
rather than consumer goods.80
It appears that the Citicorp court based its decision upon
considerations of fairness. As the court stated: "It would be
unconscionable for the partnership to take advantage of a sit-
uation in [sic] which they did so much to help bring about.
The whole transaction between the partnership and [the auc-
tion company] fairly reeks with fraud . ... s
The court of appeals' opinion in Citicorp, therefore, fails
to resolve the question of whether the close connectedness
doctrine is available outside of the consumer credit area to
alleviate harsh effects of HDC status. Although the court
seeks to limit the doctrine, it is clear that its principles are
equally applicable in nonconsumer situations. While, as the
court noted, the two previous Kentucky cases addressing the
doctrine were themselves limited situations in which manufac-
turers or sellers financed sales of their own products, 2 the
cases do not explicitly reject a wider application of the doc-
trine under the proper circumstances.
IV. COMMERCIAL REASONABLENESS UNDER U.C.C. SECTION
9-504
Part five of article nine of the U.C.C. establishes the rela-
tive rights and duties of the debtor and creditor in the event
of default under a valid security agreement.8 3 Although the
secured party may repossess and under certain conditions re-
tain the collateral, 4 the usual course of action involves a sale
or other disposition of the collateral by the secured party,
pursuant to U.C.C. section 9-504. This section allows the se-
cured party to dispose of the collateral by either public or pri-
433.1(b) (1980).
80 439 S.W.2d at 58.
81 605 S.W.2d at 28.
82 Id.
83 KRS §§ 355.9-501 to -507 (1972).
8- KRS §§ 355.9-503, -505(2). The retention procedure is called "strict foreclo-
sure." See generally WHrrE & SuMzEPs, supra note 26, at § 26-8; Annot., 55 A.L.R.3d
651 (1974).
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vate sale subject to two basic requirements. First, the debtor
generally must be given reasonable notification of the time
and place for a public sale or of the time after which the col-
lateral may be disposed of in a private transaction. In addi-
tion, except where consumer goods are involved, any other
person claiming a security interest in the collateral must be
notified in like manner. Second, every aspect of the disposi-
tion, including the method, time, place, and terms, must sat-
isfy a standard of commercial reasonableness."5
Although Kentucky courts have addressed problems asso-
ciated with the notice requirement of U.C.C. section 9-504,86
85 KRS § 355.9-504(3) (1972) states:
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and
may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition
may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms
but every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time,
place and terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is per-
ishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily
sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time after which
any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by
the secured party to the debtor, and except in the case of consumer goods
to any other person who has a security interest in the collateral and who
has duly filed a financing statement indexed in the name of the debtor in
this state or who is known by the secured party to have a security interests
in the collateral. The secured party may buy at any public sale and ff the
collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a type
which is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations he may
buy at private sale.
Id.
The term "commercially reasonable" is not defined in the U.C.C. According to
Grant Gilmore, who was instrumental in drafting article 9, the aims of U.C.C. § 9-504
were to promote easy disposition of collateral at the highest possible price and to
encourage the use of regular market channels. Gilmore, The Secured Transactions
Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 27, 43 (1951). In order to
avoid the collusion and unfair dealings by "gangs of thieves" common in repossession
sales, the code sought to reduce the standard for recovery by debtors from "fraud" to
"commercial reasonableness" and to allow the courts more power to fashion the stan-
dard of review. Id.
"e See Nelson v. Monarch Inv. Plan, 452 S.W.2d 375 (Ky. 1970). Nelson involved
a suit by a secured creditor to recover a deficiency on a note executed for the
purchase of an automobile. While considering the notice requirement of § 9-504 and
its exceptions, including the meaning of "a type customarily sold in a recognized mar-
ket," the Court found that the debtor was entitled to notification on a specific date
after which the creditor could proceed with disposal of the collateral. Id. at 377. The
notice requirement was designed to allow the debtor to protect his or her interest.
See also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 26, at § 26-10; Comment, Defending Deft-
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there was little discussion of the commercial reasonableness
standard before the recent case of Bank of Josephine v.
Conn. 7 In Conn, the debtor defaulted on a promissory note
and security agreement covering the balance due on two coal
trucks. After an agent of the bank called on the debtor stating
that the bank had a buyer for the trucks, the debtor trans-
ferred title to the bank under an arrangement which he
claimed discharged the indebtedness. The bank therefore took
"constructive possession" of the trucks, not having them in its
actual physical control. The anticipated sale of the trucks
failed to materialize, and the bank did not take physical pos-
session of the collateral until five weeks after the transfer of
title, during which time the trucks were stripped of parts and
damaged. Six weeks after the transfer of title the bank noti-
fied the debtor of a public sale to be held in eleven days. At
the sale the bank submitted the only bid, and subsequently
resold the trucks for $5,000 more than its bid, leaving a deficit
of approximately $7,300 on the note, for which the bank sued
the debtor. The Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld a jury
verdict finding the bank's actions commercially unreasonable
and denied recovery of the deficiency.
The Conn decision is significant to several aspects of the
commercial reasonableness requirement. First, the court of
appeals found, at least where the creditor is seeking to recover
a deficiency judgment, that the burden of proving the com-
mercial reasonableness of the liquidation sale will be upon the
ciency Judgments Suits in Kentucky: Article Nine, Part 5 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 61 Ky. L.J. 578, 583-87 (1973). Note, however, that in Nelson, although the
debtor did not receive adequate notice, he was estopped to claim failure of notice by
his own actions after repossession. 452 S.W.2d at 378.
The Court briefly considered the notice requirement in Bank of Josephine v.
Hopson, 516 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1974), and found that notice sent to the debtor by
registered mail was sufficient. A similar superficial reference to the notice require-
ment was made in Greg Coats Cars, Inc. v. Kasey, 576 S.W.2d 251 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978). Although none of these cases explicitly mentions which party has the burden
of proof on the notice issue, the clear implication of Nelson is that this responsibility
falls on the secured party, an approach consistent with the majority view. See, e.g.,
National Rep. Bank v. Proctor, 383 N.E.2d 1310 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); North Carolina
Nat'l Bank v. Burnette, 247 S.E.2d 648 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978), rev'd on other grounds,
256 S.E.2d 388 (N.C. 1979).
87 599 S.W.2d 773 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
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creditor.8 8 Prior to enactment of the U.C.C., the burden of
showing that unreasonable sales methods were employed
rested upon the debtor.8s Under the U.C.C., jurisdictions con-
sidering the issue have focused on whether the suit was by the
creditor for a deficiency or whether it was a suit by the debtor
for damages under U.C.C. section 9-507.8° In the former situa-
tion the burden is usually placed upon the secured party, but
in the latter there is a split of authority concerning placement
of the burden of proof.91
An early deficiency case under the U.C.C. in Kentucky9 2
declared that the secured party must introduce evidence of a
liquidation sale and of a deficiency in order to pursue a defi-
ciency judgment.93 The issue in that case, however, was not
the reasonableness of the liquidation sale but the fact of its
occurrence. The issue of the burden of proof in a deficiency
suit implicitly surfaced again in Bank of Josephine v. Hop-
son.94 In rejecting the debtors' claim that the bank dealt with
the collateral in a commercially unreasonable manner, the
Court stated: "We simply do not feel that the [debtors] have
proven any violation of KRS 355.9-503 to 355.9-505."9l Al-
though this statement may be interpreted as an implication
that a debtor has the burden of showing commercial unrea-
88 Id. at 774.
88 Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 369, 372 (1974). See Home Fin. Co. v. Frazier, 380 S.W.2d
91, 93 (Ky. 1964). The Frazier court stated: "No effort was made to show bad faith or
lack of diligence in the conduct of the sales after repossession. As noted, [the debtor]
was present at the sale; he made no bid. Neither did he express any dissatisfaction
with the sale or the manner of conducting it." Id.
9 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Halston, 559 P.2d 440, 444 (Okla.
1976). See generally Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 369 (1974).
:I See Annot., supra note 90, at 375-76.
02 Cox Motor Car Co. v. Castle, 402 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1966). Actually, the pur-
chaser/debtor instituted this suit as a breach of warranty action. The creditor coun-
terclaimed for a deficiency on the promissory note.
93 Id. at 432. That a resale was held must be proven in order to qualify for a
deficiency. This follows from KRS § 355.9-505(2) (1972), which provides that the
creditor may "retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation." If the secured
party retains the collateral, the right to a deficiency is lost. Thus in order to claim a
deficiency the secured party must demonstrate that the collateral was sold pursuant
to KRS § 355.9-504 (1972).
9' 516 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1974). Hopson involved a deficiency on a note and secur-
ity agreement covering a tractor and accessories.
91 Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 69
SURVEY-COMMERCIAL LAW
sonableness in all situations, the Court offered no explanation
of its statement.9 6
Any implication in Hopson, however, that the debtor has
the burden of proof in deficiency suits has been negated by
the court of appeals' decision in Conn. Conn established that
a secured creditor seeking a deficiency judgment against a
debtor after a resale of the collateral has the burden of prov-
ing that all elements of the sale were commercially reasonable
and the burden of proving notice as well. 17 The Conn decision,
however, fails to establish which party will have the burden in
a suit by the debtor for damages under U.C.C. section 9-507.11
A second significant aspect of Conn is the court's conclu-
sion that a violation of the commercial reasonableness stan-
dard of U.C.C. section 9-504 will result by estoppel in a com-
plete denial of the deficiency.9 Unreasonable acts by the
96 It is possible the Court was merely saying that the debtors had not produced
evidence substantial enough to overcome a small presumption in favor of the com-
mercial reasonableness of the sale. Cf. Sumner v. Century Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
402 N.Y.S.2d 285, 289 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (declaring that the presumption of com-
mercial reasonableness is not "ordinarily overcome by naked assertions of
impropriety").
97 599 S.W.2d at 774.
11 Id. Although the Court cited KRS § 355.9-506 (1972), the reference is appar-
ently to KRS § 355.9-507 (1972). KRS § 355.9-506 addresses a right of the debtor to
redeem the collateral before sale.
In attempting to decide the burden of proof issue in a suit brought by the debtor,
the courts should consider the factors and policy considerations raised by some com-
mentators and courts indicating that placement of the burden on the creditor in all
situations is ill-advised. For example, one commentator has observed that "the fact
that the creditor is under a duty to act in a commercially reasonable manner does not
determine that he has the burden of proof." 4 R. ANDERSON, THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE § 9-504:13.1 (Supp. 1980). Anderson points out the general pre-code princi-
ple that placed the burden upon the party who had the affirmative of the issue. Since
the debtor would benefit from a finding of unreasonable conduct, he or she should
have the burden. Anderson would not place the burden on the creditor even in a
deficiency suit, although it would seem that the creditor is the party who stands to
benefit in such a situation.
Additionally, unlike the notice requirement where the creditor does have the bet-
ter access to the proof, the assumption that the creditor has better information than
the debtor concerning commercial practices may not be valid outside of consumer
goods transactions, especially in light of current discovery techniques. Id. See also
WHrrE & SUMmERS, supra note 26, at § 26-11. See generally Wells v. Central Bank,
347 So.2d 114 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); Pruske v. National Bank of Commerce, 533
S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
" 599 S.W.2d at 775.
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creditor, however, need not invariably compel this result,10
although the majority of jurisdictions that have considered
the problem have reached a conclusion similar to that reached
in Conn. 01 It is important to note, however, that the jurisdic-
tions composing the "majority" view may be subdivided into
two distinct groups: those that require compliance with U.C.C.
provisions as a precondition to any recovery and those that
declare that non-compliance raises only a rebuttable presump-
tion that the sale price was unfair.10 2 Courts in the first group
will never allow the non-complying creditor to recover a defi-
ciency. Within the second group the creditor may recover a
deficiency by demonstrating that the sale price was fair and
reasonable despite non-compliance with U.C.C. provisions.
Because Conn bases denial of a deficiency on estoppel, the
Kentucky court appears to be adopting the stricter view.
Thus, where the creditor acts unreasonably, a deficiency judg-
ment is lost entirely.
A third potentially significant aspect of Conn is the
court's reference to the fact that the secured creditor was the
only bidder at the sale.10 3 Although U.C.C. section 9-504(3)
authorizes the secured party to purchase at a public sale, and
under certain conditions at a private sale,104 questions may
arise as to the reasonableness of a claimed deficiency where
the secured party is the ultimate purchaser or sole bidder. A
court may scrutinize the result more closely. Several courts
have found a secured creditor who purchases at a private sale
contrary to the conditions of U.C.C. section 9-504 to be in the
100 See, e.g., Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Prods., Inc., 535 P.2d
1077 (N.M. 1975).
101 For a discussion and listing of the majority and minority positions on this
issue, see 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 98, at § 9-504:30; WHrTE & SUMMERS, supra note
26, at § 26-15.
102 This distinction is discussed in WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 26, at § 26-15.
03 599 S.W.2d at 775. One authority cites BSY Co. v. Fuel Economy Eng'r Co.,
399 S.W.2d 308 (Ky. 1965), as a case involving the commercial reasonableness of a
sole bid and purchase by the secured party. 6G BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
SERVICE § 9-504, Annotation A8 (1980). Nevertheless, it is the better view to construe
that case as involving the retention of collateral by the secured party in full satisfac-
tion of the debt under KRS § 355.9-505(2) (1972) rather than its purchase at a sale
under KRS § 355.9-504(3) (1972).
104 For the text of KRS § 355.9-504(3) (1972), see note 85 supra.
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same position as one who engages in commercially unreasona-
ble conduct. 10 5 Where a creditor purchases at a public sale or
satisfies the prerequisites for purchasing at a private sale,106
courts have imposed a high standard of commercial conduct
on the secured party when the price received results in a defi-
ciency.10 7 These courts, in viewing the principal aim of the
U.C.C. default provisions as encouraging conditions for receipt
of the best possible price, have required the secured party ac-
tively to pursue competitive bidding. For example, the Su-
preme Court of Washington has established strict guidelines
that the secured party must meet in order to pursue a defi-
ciency judgment after successfully bidding at a resale:
The sale is valid where notice of the sale is (1) given to the
defaulted debtor and to the public sufficiently in advance to
allow interested bidders a reasonable opportunity to partici-
pate, (2) given to a "public" reasonably expected to have an
interest in the collateral to be sold and notifying the public
of the exact time of sale and place of sale, reasonably conve-
nient to potential bidders, (3) sufficiently replete with infor-
mation describing the collateral to be sold and the amount
of the obligation for which it is being sold to allow potential
bidders a genuine opportunity to make an informed judg-
ment as to whether to bid at the sale and (4) published in a
manner reasonably calculated to assure such publicity that
the collateral will bring the best possible price from the
competitive bidding of a strived-for lively concourse for bid-
ders. If a sale is conducted under these circumstances, "[t]he
fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at
a different time or in a different method from that selected
by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish
that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable
manner."
108
105 Barber v. Leroy, 115 Cal. Rptr. 272 (Ct. App. 1974); Jackson State Bank v.
Beck, 577 P.2d 168 (Wyo. 1978).
106 "Prerequisites" of a private sale apply to the sale of collateral of a type cus-
tomarily sold in a recognized market or to a sale that is the subject of widely distrib-
uted standard price quotations. KRS § 355.9-504(3) (1972).
"0 See, e.g., Connex Press, Inc. v. International Airmotive, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 51
(D.D.C. 1977), afl'd, 574 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Kobuk Eng'r & Contr. Serv., Inc.
v. Superior Tank & Constr. Co., 568 P.2d 1007 (Alaska 1977).
108 Foster v. Knutson, 527 P.2d 1108, 1114-15 (Wash. 1974) (quoting WASH. REV.
1980-811
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69
Practitioners would benefit from a review of these cases
and from consideration of the factors enumerated by the
courts herein before advising clients on notice and advertising
of the sale, location of the sale, preparation of the collateral
and the solicitation of bids if the secured party will also bid.
V. SUFFICIENCY OF DESCRIPTION UNDER ARTICLE NINE
A "sufficiency of description"109 question may arise under
article nine in several ways. Usually the problem involves an
examination of the security agreement provisions between the
debtor and the creditor regarding items intended to serve as
collateral. 110 If their delineation lacks explicitness, the secur-
ity agreement cannot be enforced against the debtor or third
parties."' A second type of description problem involves the
financing statement and concerns the issue of a subsequent
creditor receiving adequate "notice" of the prior secured
party's interest in a specific item.11 2 Failure here will result in
CODE § 62A.9-507(2)).
'-- KRS § 335.9-110 (1972) defines "sufficiency of description": "For the pur-
poses of this article any description of personal property or real estate is sufficient
whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described." Id.
.10 This is the problem the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed in Mammoth
Cave Prod. Credit Assoc. v. York, 429 S.W.2d 26 (Ky. 1968). The Court found that
the descriptions of collateral in the granting and after-acquired property clauses of
the security agreement, covering "[a]U farm equipment" and "[a]ll property similar
to that listed above" respectively, were too "vague and indefinite" to reasonably iden-
tify the property actually agreed upon as collateral. Id. at 29. The Court concluded:
"In light of this vague provision it seems doubtful that it was really agreed that trac-
tors and other large farm equipment were to be security for the loan." Id.
I KRS § 355.9-203(1) (1972) provides in part: [A] security interest is not
enforceable against the debtor or third parties unless . . . (b) the debtor
has signed a security agreement which contains a description of the collat-
eral and in addition, when the security interest covers crops or oil, gas or
minerals to be extracted or timber to be cut, a description of the land
concerned.
Id. (emphasis added).
"I See, e.g., In re Drane, 202 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Ky. 1962), where the issue was
whether the description of certain pieces of furniture in a security agreement (a se-
curity agreement can serve as a financing statement if it meets the formal requisites
of a financing statement as set forth in KRS § 355.9-402 (1972)) recorded in the
county clerk's office was adequate to allow a third party to easily identify the items
covered by the security agreement. See also In re Anselm, 344 F. Supp. 544, 547
(W.D. Ky. 1972) (financing statement describing collateral as "tilling and harvesting
tools" was held insufficient to give notice of covering a mower, reaper and fertilizer
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lack of perfection of the security interest.11 A third problem
centers around the description of land upon which secured
crops are either growing or are to be grown. This issue may
involve both of the above enforceability and notice questions
regarding collateral.1 4 In Bank of Danville v. Farmers Na-
tional Bank,"' the Kentucky Supreme Court considered the
first Kentucky case falling into this third category of descrip-
tion issues. The result raises some questions concerning the
Court's earlier decision in Mammoth Cave Production Credit
Assoc. v. York. 6
Bank of Danville concerned a priority contest between
secured creditors over the proceeds from sale of the debtors'
1975 tobacco crop. The Bank of Danville (Bank) recorded a
security agreement on February 19, 1975, covering cattle, farm
machinery, and the debtors' 1975 tobacco and barley crops.
The security agreement declared: "The Collateral will be kept
at the address indicated in the heading, otherwise will be lo-
cated at: on farm of Dale Wilson on Lancaster Road, 4 miles
from Danville, Boyle County, Kentucky. 11 7 On April 8, 1975,
the debtors executed a financing statement and security
because this description failed to adequately indicate the type of collateral held).
11 KRS § 355.9-402(1) (1972) provides in part: (1) A financing statement is
sufficient if it is signed by the debtor and the secured party, gives an ad-
dress of the secured party from which information concerning the security
interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address of the debtor and con-
tains a statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral
.... When the financing statement covers crops growing or to be grown
• the statement must also contain a description of the real estate
concerned.
Id. (emphasis added).
KRS § 355.9-402(4) (1972) provides an example of the proper form of the financ-
ing statement.
"' For relevant portions of KRS § 355.9-203(1), -402(1) (1972), see notes 111 and
113 supra.
115 602 S.W.2d 160 (Ky. 1980).
116 429 S.W.2d 26 (Ky. 1968). See note 110 supra and the text accompanying
notes 127-29 infra for a discussion of the Mammoth Cave case.
117 602 S.W.2d at 160-61. Both the Supreme Court and the court of appeals ap-
parently viewed the security agreement filed by the Bank as filling the role of the
financing statement as well. In any event, the requirement that the real estate be
described when crops are covered applies equally to the security agreement and the
financing statement, and failure under either will defeat perfection of the security
interest. KRS §§ 355.9-203(1), -303 (1972).
1980-81]
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agreement to Farmers National Bank (Farmers). The collat-
eral was described as "one-half interest in 48,900 lb. tobacco
to be grown on Kenneth Bailey (formerly Dale Wilson) farm,
Lancaster Road, Danville, Ky. 40422. ' ' 11s Farmers sent certi-
fied notification to all the tobacco warehouses in Danville of
its "mortgage." Unlike Farmers, the Bank made no attempt to
advise these warehouses. Thus, after sale of the tobacco,
Farmers received more than $22,000 from one of the ware-
houses by checks made payable to the debtor, his lessor and
Farmers. Farmers applied the money to retire the debtors'
note and disbursed the remainder, with the debtors' consent,
to pay off other creditors, not including the Bank.1" The
Bank brought suit against Farmers to recover sums received
upon sale of the tobacco, claiming it had a valid and enforcea-
ble security agreement that had priority over Farmers'. Farm-
ers contended, however, that the Bank's security interest was
not enforceable due to the insufficiency of the description of
the land contained in the security agreement. The circuit
court held for the Bank, but the Kentucky Court of Appeals
reversed. 120
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision,
holding the description adequate for "notice" purposes. The
Court declared: "The description contemplated by the stat-
utes is not required to be by metes and bounds. It does not
have to be meticulous. It is only required to be in such words
118 602 S.W.2d at 161.
9 Farmers received a total of $22,619.77 as proceeds from the sale. It applied
$8,741.34 to satisfy the debtors' note and disbursed $13,878.43 to other creditors and
to the debtor. The circuit court held Farmers liable to the Bank for the entire
amount received, a decision that the Supreme Court subsequently affirmed. 602
S.W.2d at 164.
120 Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Bank of Danville, No. 79-CA-80-MR (Ky. CL App.
August 24, 1979). The court of appeals, in reviewing the Bank's security agreement
and financing statement, could find "no description of the real estate on which these
crops are to be grown." Id. at 4. The court relied upon First Nat'l Bank v. Calvin
Pickle Co., 516 P.2d 265 (Okla. 1973), but that case is clearly distinguishable since
the financing statement there contained no reference at all to the real estate upon
which the crops listed as collateral were to be grown. The Bank of Danville's descrip-
tion did make at least some mention of the real estate-referring to the "farm of Dale
Wilson"--but the court of appeals interpreted that reference as applying only to the




and terms that it can be readily located."12' The description
contained in the Bank's security agreement filed with the
county clerk was adequate. This conclusion is in accord with
the majority of those jurisdictions that have considered the
same issue. 122 In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court
confused the purpose of a financing statement with that of a
security agreement. By holding that the security agreement
was adequate to provide notice, the Court misconceived the
purpose of the security agreement, which is evidentiary in na-
ture and is designed to protect against future disputes as to
what collateral was intended to secure the debt.123 It is the
function of the financing statement to provide notice to third
parties of prior security interests. 2
4
The Uniform Commercial Code contains one test for de-
scriptions in general: they must reasonably identify what they
describe. 25 Although circumstances in which the sufficiency
question arises may affect a court's analysis, the test itself re-
mains constant. Therefore, a court might examine different
factors in deciding whether a description contained in a secur-
ity agreement reasonably identifies the collateral than it
would in assessing the notice requirement of the financing
statement. For example, a financing statement might reasona-
bly be less specific in describing collateral, since its primary
purpose is to provide notice to third parties. 26 In light of its
liberal decision in Bank of Danville, the Court's previous deci-
sion in Mammoth Cave might be questioned. In Mammoth
122 602 S.W.2d at 162-63.
122 See Annot., 67 A.L.R.3d 308 (1975).
123 U.C.C. § 9-203 comment 3.
124 U.C.C. § 9-402 comment 2.
121 See note 109 supra for the definition of "sufficiency of description" in KRS §
355.9-110 (1972).
126 U.C.C. § 9-110 comment states: "The requirement of description of collateral
(see Section 9-203 and Comment thereto) is evidentiary. The test of sufficiency of a
description ... [is] that it makes possible the identification of the thing described."
Id. (emphasis added). U.C.C. § 9-203 comment 3 continues: "The requirement of a
written record minimizes the possibility of future dispute as to the terms of a security
agreement and as to what property stands as collateral for the obligation secured."
U.C.C. § 9-203 comment 5 further explains: "The formal requisite of a writing stated
in this section is not only a condition to the enforceability of a security interest
against third parties, it is in the nature of a Statute of Frauds."
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Cave, the Court concluded from the face of the security agree-
ment that the description "[all] farm equipment" and the ref-
erence in the after-acquired property clause to "all property
similar" was too vague to indicate agreement that a tractor
was covered as after-acquired property. 127 This case has been
criticized because of the Court's failure to establish the actual
intent of the agreement between the creditor and debtor, 128
and because of its failure to apply the liberal approach of
U.C.C. section 9-110 (Sufficiency of Description).129 In con-
trast, Bank of Danville implies that when there is some ambi-
guity or vagueness in a description, the court may examine
extraneous factors. Bank of Danville required only that the
land be "readily located" by reference to the description, 30
declaring "that is certain which can be made certain .... "1131
This proposition of law is more consistent with the code's ba-
sic philosophy than is the Court's reasoning in Mammoth
Cave. The Bank of Danville case, however, concerned a land
description, rather than a collateral description. Whether the
Court will apply the liberal approach taken in Bank of Dan-
ville to a description of collateral in a future Mammoth Cave
situation and whether the Court will distinguish the require-
ments and differing purposes of security agreements and
financing statements, however, remains to be seen.
12 429 S.W.2d at 29.
128 See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 470 F.2d 944 (8th Cir. 1973);
Skilton, Security Interests in After-Acquired Property Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 925, 937-41; Note, Agricultural Financing Under the
U.C.C., 12 ARiz. L. REv. 391, 394 (1970); Note, Description of Collateral in a Financ-
ing Statement: Should It be Required?, 4 VAL. L. REv. 205, 216 (1969).
12 See note 109 supra for text of this section.
130 602 S.W.2d at 162-63.
131 Id. at 163 (quoting Ken-Tex Exploration Co. v. Conner, 251 S.W.2d 280, 281
(Ky. 1952)).
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